The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War

This book provides an excellent overview of the rise and fall of the Japanese Empire. The author analyzes why Japan, who was successful in two wars (First Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese) yet failed miserably in two later conflicts (Second Sino-Japanese and Pacific War against the USA). The picture painted is one of temporary success achieved by a modernizing group of leaders (Meiji Generation) who used all aspects of grand strategy (economic, foreign policy, social and military) to achieve the goal of making Japan not only fit into the arena of the Western dominated global system but also developed their country into a regional player as well. Their success, however, was fleeting as these men failed to institutionalize their new structure and Japan essentially reverted to their old bushido based society as the army, the most organized and effective organization, filled the void left by the Meiji Men. In their early wars, Japan emulated the Prussian model embodied by Otto von Bismarck who skillfully demonstrated what Clausewitz meant when he said war was politics by other means. Japanese leaders in the first two wars carefully crafted their goals and then used warfare (among other things) to bring their vision to fruition, In contrast, the later Japanese leaders (mid 1920’s onward) fell into the same trap as their future allies in Germany by relying solely on an military operational approach to achieve their goals, an approach that doomed them. For example, in the first two wars the Japanese leaders laid the foundation for an exit strategy even before the first shots were fired whereas later they made no effort to prepare for that eventual step of war termination. The author also spends a good deal of time comparing and contrasting continental versus maritime powers. This is useful not only for general knowledge and analyzing military conflicts throughout history, but it also becomes the bedrock of his critical point: Japan’s biggest failure was its attempt to become a continental power when geography clearly indicated their greatest chance of success and power lay in making themselves into a great maritime power. As one might expect this book is one of decision making and grand strategy so you will not find any in depth discussion of campaigns or battles except in how it reflected the strategy that Japan tried to execute that it mistakenly thought was grand strategy when in reality it was operationally based. Along with all this analysis Paine makes insightful observations regarding different aspects of the conflicts involved and helps the reader to see the situation in the same light as those who lived through this tumultuous time.. For examples, in his discussion regarding the US use of atomic bombs he writes “During the war, Americans did not feel angst over the enemy civilian death toll from the air war or even from the atomic bombs. They had lost too many of their own children and wanted a victory that minimized their own children’s deaths. Only from the security of a postwar world, no longer under threat of Imperial Japanese or Nazi German aggression, have subsequent generations criticized the air war.” The parallels he draws between Germany’s war with Russia and the Japanese war with China are also interesting as well. In the end, I highly recommend this book to anyone who wants to learn the basics about the Japanese Empire during this crucial period. The analysis of not only the Japanese decision making but also the principles of grand strategy and the fundamental differences of continental and maritime powers in their pursuit of security richly packs this quite pithy (187 pages) book.

This is such a good book. Though I lived in Japan for many years, speak the language, and graduated with a Bachelor's in East Asian Studies, it wasn't until I read this book, as part of my studies with the Naval War College, that I really understood the real causes for Japan entering World War II (simply put) and its subsequent defeat. Aside from that, this book has so many rich nuggets that apply to strategy / grand strategy writ large with thinking about international relations / conflict. The writing is so rich, succinct, and polished. One of the most treasured books in my collection.

The Japanese Empire provides a solid overview for the rise and fall of Imperial Japan in terms of foreign policy, particularly in regard to military policies and choices. If one is seeking a thorough, or in depth history of the Empire, this is not the study to access. Interestingly, this book does provide a succinct analysis of the primary factors driving the overall developments and consequences of Japan's military policies at a high level. It also places the direction of those policy choices into a useful theoretical framework of strategic, tactical, situational, and functional evaluations. I found the study valuable for what it covers and it should serve well either as an overview to introduce a reader to the subject for a broader study of the Japanese Empire as a whole or for even more thorough studies into the for the history of Japanese foreign policy in the period from the Meiji Restoration through World War 2. What it is best for, however, is as a case study in the practical factors that influenced the successes and/or failures of the leadership in Imperial Japan in pursuing its military policies.

Who knows if grand strategy is real? More importantly, who cares when there are books as good as this? Come for the history, stay for the discussion of incentives, and enjoy the economics throughout.

It was a very info dense book. It seemed like each sentence could easily be the lead sentence to a separate paragraph. I learned a lot. This book has to be carefully read, not skimmed.

In-depth analysis combined with clear explanations make this a joy to read and super interesting. Well done. Highly recommended read!

The author analyzes the actions of the Japanese from the Meiji generation to the end of World War II, suggesting which decisions and events lead to which outcomes. Well reasoned and explained.

Reading Sarah Paine is not only an education, but her way of weaving the story makes the read very easy and, at times, even fun. Her discussions of Japan, China, and Russia on YouTube brings out the wit with more turns of phrase and a sense of humor that borders on a British style of sarcasm.

Klasse auf den Punkt gebracht in gut verständlichem, elegantem Englisch. Die Korephäe auf dem Gebiet.

Excelente livro explicando a época da restauração Meiji e seus impactos na sociedade japonesa. Também explica os motivos que levaram o império do sucesso inicial para seu eclipse sangrento na segunda guerra mundial. Da uma visão geral sobre os motivos que levaram o Japão a entrar na segunda guerra

Authoratative and well written in a clear and informative style.

Sarah C. M. Paine, docente allo United States Naval College, offre in The Japanese Empire un affresco a volo d'uccello della storia politico-militare giapponese dalle cause della rivoluzione Meiji alla disfatta nell'estate 1945. L'autrice si concentra molto sulla guerra sino-giapponese (1894-95) e sul conflitto contro la Russia zarista (1904-05), che individua come pivotali nella strutturazione di una strategia nazionale che, tuttavia, soffre della divisione tra una visione "continentale" difesa dall'esercito e di una postura più "marittima" propugnata dalla marina imperiale. Paine sostiene che Tokyo non seppe decidersi su quale delle due prediligere, imboccando prima l'una e poi l'altra con il risultato di combattere guerre sovradimensionate rispetto le sue reali possibilità. Si tratta del caso della seconda guerra sino-giapponese (1937-45), il cui lungo incubare è del pari trattato, ma più sinteticamente rispetto a quanto fatto nei capitoli precedenti. Allo stesso modo, le ostilità contro le potenze occidentali sono esposte in un'agile riassunto. Di valore, a mio avviso, è l'apertura di cui gode quest'opera: l'autrice riporta operazioni militari, crimini di guerra, motivazioni economiche, ragioni politiche, azioni unilaterali delle forze armate; presenta brevemente anche alcune personalità cruciali nella storia imperiale nipponica; fornisce cifre su differenti voci (forze in campo, perdite, spese militari, indici di produzione e così via). Di buona qualità le mappe, inserite tra un capitolo e l'altro. Di sicuro è un libro eccellente per avvicinarsi, pur senza dettagliati approfondimenti, all'Impero giapponese pre-1945, stante anche il registro linguistico non criptico.

This is an astounding slim volume with a surprising amount of detail. The central question asked is, what was the central strategic policy of Japan. How did it change over time and what were the influencing factors. Paine answers the questions of why and how Japan became destabiliser to the international regime. This happened in spite of the fact that Japan has a lot going for it as a naval power who could have defended her interests with a sea-based strategy incorporating open seas, free trade and investment in Asia, with almost no emphasis on building a large land-based Army. Essentially the policy of a Britain of the East. Such a decisive naval strategy had delivered results in the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japan war. As the old-regime of the Genro died however the inability to make compromise, consistent armed victory, and hyper-Shinto-ism led to military controlling most of the levers in politics with direct access to the Emperor, bypassing the elective representatives. Political assassination reinforced political compliance to the military and the weak institutions guaranteed the influence of the military on Strategic policy. Weak institutions in the past could cobble together deals between the Genro founders of modern Japan who rivaled each other, but who possessed an international outlook, valued economic development, and compromise. Once they were gone they weak institutions they created crystalised mindsets. As Paine says "the Genro built the institutions. they were not the creatures of the institutions." Once they were largely gone the weak institutions of government ceased to become goalposts to maneuvre around and cut deals within. They then became the determinants of governance. When combined with Hyper-shinto-ism mentality governance ceased to be flexible if it did not conform to nationalist perspectives. Indeed those who went against the system were intimidated and often killed. With these developments it was a small step to the Kwantung Army being able to influence policy to set up Japan on a policy of continental dominance against Russia, then China and the US. This turn to continental policy fated Japan and doomed her at the same time, since according to Paine it was not necessary for Japan to guarantee both territorial integrity and economic success. It is a cautionary tale and one to keep in mind as another challenger to continental stability in Asia rears its head.