Storm Over Leyte: The Philippine Invasion and the Destruction of the Japanese Navy

John Prados is well known to careful readers of World War II history as one of the best historical researchers and writers about the Pacific War. Here he turns his attention to the largest naval battle in history, the Battle for Leyte Gulf. Starting with C Vann Woodward's account of this battle, I have on my bookshelf no fewer than 10 other accounts all or part of this battle, some of them by other eminent historians including Evan Thomas and Anthony Tully, Robert Lundgren, and James Hornfischer. plus of course there are other versions incorporated into larger surveys of the Pacific war, going back to Samuel Eliot Morison's multi-volume history of the entire American naval side of WW II. So, what can be added at this date?Prados takes advantage of additional declassified information concerning US radio intelligence. He delves into the personalities of the major actors, including those in the Imperial Japanese Navy. He skillfully gives a thorough background, a vivid and detailed account of events, and a reasonable set of opinions about the many controversies. It is illuminating (at least to me) to read that Halsey could not have easily placed his fast battleships (the to-be-formed if needed Task Force 34) to guard the exit from the San Bernardino strait into Leyte Gulf against the advance of the Japanese surface forces under Admiral Kurita, given his geographic position when he decided to go north to chase the Japanese carrier fleet commanded by Admiral Ozawa. He offers the reasonable speculation that turn away from torpedoes that took his largest battleship, the Yamato, and the next most powerful, the Nagato out of the battle for a critial period was ordered by his subordinate Admiral Ugaki, who chafed under Kurita's command.All in all this is a well-written, thoroughly documented, and balanced view of a familiar story. It added to my knowledge and insight, and I'm glad to have read it.

John Prados tells us in his preface that he has unearthed new information based on previously unavailable intelligence and other sources, but I felt like I learned very little.One thing I did learn was that once Halsey decided to chase Ozawa's decoy fleet to the north, there was no way his battleships could have gotten to the San Bernardino Strait in time to intercept Kurita's fleet, even if they had steamed at a full 28 knot, given the distance they were on the prior day.Another insight supports Admiral Kurita's decision to send his ships at the American escort carriers in general chase rather than in an orderly formation. Kurita believed he had come upon fast fleet carriers and cruisers, in which case only his heavy cruisers and some of his battleships but not the giant Yamato had the speed to keep up with them.Prados has a bad habit of describing the action as reported by the Japanese, for example, without parenthetically providing correct information on damaged or sunk ships or lack there of. For example, describing the Battle of Leyte Gulf, we are told that American "cruisers" have been damaged even though there were none there, and that three carriers exploded. What casualties did actually occur? You have to keep that question in mind for pages at least, and in this particular example he never answered it.He made lots of little errors:He writes that Admiral Raymond Spruance was commander of Task Force 58 (the fast carrier force) at the battle of the Philippine Sea. Spruance was commander of the Fifth Fleet, and Marc Mitscher was commander of Task Force 58.He says that the US submarines based at Freemantle belonged to "MacArthur's navy". That's wrong. All Pacific Fleet submarines reported to COMSUBPAC in Pearl Harbor.He says that Balikpapan is on the north coast of Borneo. It's on the south east coast.He calls American code breaking of Japanese signals "Ultra" (and sometimes bizarrely "the Ultra"), but the Americans called it "Magic" during the war.He suggests that Japanese Admiral Nagumo Chuichi was "one of the Imperial Navy's apostles of air power", when in fact he was a surface Admiral with no air experience prior to Pearl Harbor, and who had lost four carriers at the disastrous Battle of Midway.He consistently calls the Japanese "Shinden" interceptor the "Shiden".He writes several times that Admiral Halsey lent his ground forces to General MacArthur. Yet Halsey went ahead with the Peleliu invasion prior to the Leyte landings, and no Marine divisions were pulled from the upcoming Iwo Jima invasion to instead invade the Philippines.He claims that Japanese Admiral Ozawa was "in on the destruction of the British battleships Prince of Wales and Repulse", but those ships were sunk entirely by Japanese airplanes, and Repulse was, in fact, a battlecruiser.He also is prone to repeat things. I don't know how many times he went through the damage to the Japanese Second Fleet, starting with initial damage to the battleship Musashi, then its torpedo damage, and eventual sinking, all within a dozen pages or so. Likewise his many descriptions of how admiral Shima's Fifth Fleet bounced around among superior commanders, and how a Tokyo Express-style reinforcement mission to Leyte never materialized.Any mention of Davy Jones and/or his locker in a serious history book is unwelcome, and there were far too many of those here. Likewise, repeated use of the nickname "tin fish" for the Japanese Long Lance torpedo quickly gets tired. Destroyers are "tin cans", and good captains "know how to steer a ship".For all that, it's a fast and entertaining read, hence my neutral score.

John Prados writes this book in a style that seems to increase reader engagement the further you get into his book, in what initially starts as a slow build up ends in a comprehensive and quite detailed account of the last major fleet action of the Japanese Navy at Leyte Gulf in the Philippines.I think there are one or two other authors have covered this subject just as well, but I did warm to his style of writing in the end and would recommend this book if you are wanting to understand things slightly more from the Japanese viewpoint - overall a good book.

I loved reading this book. Slow build up on both sides and then WHAM!The action starts and you're there in the hot seat.Great event in WWII covered superbly by John Prados

A unique take on the typical history book. It shines a light on the many moving parts and behind the scenes people and events that all serve to influence the outcome of war. From Navy Intelligence to the egos and competency of leaders of both the Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States Navy you will find a lot of fresh takes and new points of view to chew on.

For the most part this is not a combat level account of naval warfare. It is is high level study of tactics and startegy fro a balanced USA/Japan view. An excellent read about the late war in the Pacific.

Very good, but, not what I expected.