The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme

I read John Keegan's The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme fourteen years ago, in April 2009. I can be precise about that because that's when I ordered it from Amazon. I was reminded of it two days ago by two things. The first was an essay "Michael Taylor on John Keegan’s The Face of Battle: A Retrospective". The second was a chain of literary free associations. I recently finished Leigh Bardugo's Six of Crows series. Kaz Brekker and his team of Crows reminded me of Rudyard Kipling's Stalky & Co.. From there it was a short mental leap to the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and from there to the only book I have read that I know to be by a Sandhurst professor, John Keegan. (To be accurate, I think I also read Keegan's A History of Warfare many many years ago, in time out of reach of an Amazon order search.)I mention this because I feel that Kipling illuminates Keegan and The Face of Battle. Like Kipling, Keegan writes of "Famous Victories". What particularly distinguished The Face of Battle from earlier military scholarship was its focus on the soldiers as the people who won battles. And by soldiers I do not so much mean generals and kings as the common grunts. (Although, in one of his battles, Agincourt, the "grunts" on one side were French knights who would not at all appreciate being so described.) Keegan makes very clear in his first chapter, "Old, Unhappy, Far-off Things" that he thinks it is of the highest importance to see battle from their point of view. Although he doesn't entirely eschew the familiar maps of battles and discussion of tactics, he more or less implies that these things are of secondary importance compared to the psychological factors that drive the soldiers to fight and endure.Keegan, like Kipling, grew up in the company of soldiers, yet never was one himself. The reasons were similar -- Keegan was handicapped as a result of a childhood illness, and was ineligible to serve -- Kipling was too old to serve in the first World War. You have only to read Kipling's books to see how highly he revered soldiers. Indeed, in Stalky & Co. during the visit of the "Old Boys" (meaning former students of the school), who are now mostly soldiers, they are seen as gods among men. Keegan is of course more measured, but passages like this reveal how important the soldier's point of view is to him"The insight which intimacy with soldiers at this level can bring to the military historian enormously enhances his surety of touch in feeling his way through the inanimate landscape of documents and objects with which he must work. It will, I think, rob him of patience for much that passes as military history; it will diminish his interest in much of the ‘higher’ study of war – of strategic theory, of generalship, of grand strategic debate, of the machine-warfare waged by air forces and navies. And that, perhaps, is a pity. But if it leads him to question – as I have found it does me – the traditional approach to writing about combat corps à corps, to decide that, after he has read the survivors’ letters and diaries, the generals’ memoirs, the staff officers’ dispatches, that there is yet another element which he must add to anything he writes – an element compounded of affection for the soldiers he knows, a perception of the hostilities as well as the loyalties which animate a society founded on comradeship, some appreciation of the limits of leadership and obedience, a glimpse of the far shores of courage, a recognition of the principle of self-preservation ever present in even the best soldier’s nature, incredulity that flesh and blood can stand the fears with which battle will confront it and which his own deeply felt timidity will highlight – if, in short, he can learn to make up his mind about the facts of battle in the light of what all, and not merely some, of the participants felt about their predicament, then he will have taken the first and most important step in understanding battle ‘as it actually was’."The Face of Battle is an attempt by a man who never was a soldier to understand how the "face of battle" appears to a soldier. It is recognized as one of the classics of military history. It is instructive, I believe, to compare this with another classic of military history, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, by Norman F. Dixon. The contrast is not so great as the titles might lead you to expect.

I purchased this book because I read in an interview that Bernard Cornwell found it useful in his research. And I can see why: John Keegan's analysis of the battlefield is unlike anything I ever read before. He essentially brings us down to the eye-witness level of fighting, and his explanations give us an understanding of battlefields that cannot be grasped when looking at broad strokes.This book covers much territory—too much for most general enthusiasts to grasp. The first part is theory, exploring the concept of Military History. The second part covers the Battle of Agincourt, the third part gives us an extensive view of Waterloo, the fourth part illustrates The Somme, and the last part discusses the Future of Battle. I admit that I got bogged down during WWI, for my interest is in earlier centuries; so I only read about 3/4 of the book.My primary interest was in Agincourt and Waterloo. First he gives us the outline of the each battle, then he breaks it into a sequence of events and shows how the various divisions interacted with the other side (Archers vs. Infantry, Cavalry vs. Infantry and so on). I found the Agincourt chapter most instructive, though it was predominately, and necessarily, built from conjecture. I have always had my doubts that the French army was wiped out by the arrows in the initial charge, as the quick-and-dirty renditions often imply. Keegan reinforces my suspicions, for he states that in the opening volley, "Four clouds of arrows would have streaked out of the English line to reach a height of 100 feet before turning in flight to plunge at a steeper angle on and among the French men-at-arms opposite. These arrows cannot, however, given their terminal velocity and angle of impact, have done a great deal of harm...For armour, by the early fifteenth century, was composed almost completely of steel sheet, in place of the iron mail..."He theorized the archers hammered steaks in the ground, not as is often thought, in a straight line like a fence, but rather "disposed checkerboard fashion" so that "we may then visualize the French bearing down on the archers in ignorance of the hedgehog their ranks concealed." With this in mind, it's easier to imagine the chaos on the front line once the horses “found themselves on top of the stakes too late to refuse the obstacle”. Repelled, the cavalry returned into the face of the approaching men-at-arms, where it “broke up the rhythm of the advance and knocked some men to the ground”. The crunch kept coming from behind, and the “unrelenting pressure from the rear on the backs of those in the line of battle” combined with a lack of organized command gave the English archers the opportunity to charge with swords, axes and hand-weapons. Keegan gives us a convincing description of the slaughter demonstrating the effectiveness of hand-to-hand fighting against an enemy “who were plainly in no state to offer concerted resistance and scarcely able to defend themselves individually”. This is a more balanced depiction of a battle where archery, though still important, was not the only means of success.Then we abruptly jump ahead 400 years to a battle of a scale unimagined in the middle ages. Waterloo was so huge that one battalion had no clue of what another battalion was doing across the field. “The ‘five phases’ of the battle were not perceived at the time by any of the combatants, not even, despite their points of vantage and powers of direct intervention in events, by Wellington or Napoleon.” Again, we get the general overview, then shift to a comparison of Cavalry vs. Artillery, Artillery vs. Infantry, Infantry vs. Infantry and whatever combinations you could think of. To me, it both helped and hindered a total understanding of this complicated battle. To make it more personal, we get a dizzying compilation of first-hand reports that pinpoints individual experiences. In the process, I felt completely lost, which I guess is much to the point.I was intrigued by the concept of the crowd-like behavior of soldiers who could only react to what they were hearing in the front lines, especially in the French columns. “The men at the rear did nothing, or did nothing useful. Indeed, it seems safe to go further. It was at the back of the columns, not the front, that the collapse began, and the men in the rear who ran before those in the front.” It was this behavior, according to the author, “rather than direct British action, that rendered useless the most critical French attacks of the day, and led to Napoleon’s defeat.” Apparently the British squares were more successful and felt safer, for the wounded could be dragged into the center; it was also more difficult for the weaker soldiers to flee.The Somme, the discussion of which seemed more familiar to the author, relied on trench warfare, a horrific way to fight a battle. The poor infantry were obliged to follow the line of destruction laid down by the artillery, unaware that much of the noisy, explosive shells were ineffectual due to the fact that the Germans were sheltered in holes dug well below the range of the bombardments. Also, the detonations did little to remove the barbed wire which slowed many Allies down enough to get mowed down in their efforts to cut their way through. This, added to lack of communication, contributed to a casualty rate almost inconceivable to the armchair historian.Overall, though the writing was difficult to plow through, I absorbed a lot of helpful information. My own interest in military history was not up to the task, and I could not do this book justice. But it is a great reference, though it would be much better appreciated when familiar with the subject matter ahead of time.

A great classic which introduces a completely original possibly revolutionary approach to military history writing .While the orthodox military historians focused on the macrocosm picture of strategy, command and operations our author fascinated by the soldier's experience of war, tackles his subject from below by focusing on the microcosm picture , that of the ordinary men on the ground in the thick of the battle with no physical details spared.Not only he observes but he tries to explain with great psychological acumen the patterns of human conduct with their remarkable diversity, the entire gamut of actions/ reactions of the crowds in the heat of battle and the individual acts of valour and bravery or simply self preservation. By sieving through the diaries and oral recollections that evoke the individual experience of what is it like to be under fire he attempts to probe the nature of leadership, self sacrifice, comradeship under fire, fear and flight, steadfastness and resolution. This a truly fine achievement giving a gritty and far more gripping realistic account of the simple foot soldier's experience of battle from the medieval archery exchanges to the horrendous trench war of the early twentieth century.

There has to be a heading to a review and I thought of many and 'Good' doesn't remotely touch it but it lets me get to these words. I expect there are a pile of very positive reviews going back many years (this is not a recent publication) and without seeing any of them I agree with them all. I just missed National Service and never had much to do with the Armed Forces but I have always wondered how I would have dealt with active service. I suspect that this book gets you closest than any other to what it may have been like and I'm now glad that I didn't get any closer than this book. There is much to wonder at and to fascinate -- fancy having to stand to attention in the face of steady cannon fire for many hours and without flinching while two thirds of your comrades fell. If you are male I think this read is a must and makes you wonder if war is really something that we need to have as part of human endeavour. And if you are female maybe it will give some idea of what the boys get up to in their free time!

This is a brilliant insight into the progressive changes in warfare since the 14th century onwards. The statistics and other information therein provides a mine of information on weaponary, tactics, military organisation and formations, administration and associated activities. The occasional accompanying verbatim reports from various participants adds piquancy to the work. Having originally got this out of the library, I decided to purchase the book to have as another 'reference bible' for my current historical studies into warfare, combatants, resources,outcomes and aftermath.well worth a serious read.

An excellent well researched book which deals mostly with the human experience of war and its totality on those that fought.The book deals primarily with 3 battles Agincourt, Waterloo, and The Somme.What I found fascinating was the examinations of why armies and individuals take up arms, go to war, fight or in many cases not fight.Although the Author could do with adding the more modern military references of the Falklands, Gulf wars and Afghanistan to its body of work. As a book of its time (written pre Glastnost) it still should be essential reading for the serious and amatuer military historian.

It was for a present