Thunder on Dnepr: Zhukov-Stalin and the Defeat of Hitler's Blitzkrieg Hardcover – March 18, 1997

The deployment of over 3 million German and Axis troops on the German-Russian border during the spring of 1941 was reported by news services around the world, for weeks prior to the invasion. The only person who did not know the Germans were going to invade Russia in 1941 was Rip Van Winkle, and well maybe some lama herders in the Andes. Come on, 3 million guys and all the supplies, tanks, halftracks, over 500,000 horses, etc. etc. etc. Where you gonna hide all that stuff?!?! And all the recon overflights into Russian air space during the same period, and Lucy in Switzerland telling the Russians that the Germans are going to invade is too much. The Russians had to know! This is not revisionist history, it is reality pure and simple. I found this a refreshing alternative view on the invasion and subsequent actions that occurred the deeper the Germans got into Russia. It all adds up to a great counter story to prior treatments, many which don't add up based on all that was known to the world through global news reports in the late spring of 1941. You don't need spies when you have the world press reporting a massive invasion in the making. The notion that the Russians were caught off guard makes for a interesting story, but it is hog wash. The Russions knew, but Stalin insisted that they did not believe it, or at least wanted the Germans to think that. Stalin did not want to believe it either, but he sure did after 22 June! The reason the Germans got as far as they did is because they had vastly superior tactics and firepower at the start, and the Russians were fighting with millions of disillusioned anticommunists who were, initially, armed to fight in the stone age. This is a great read for anybody who is not biased about the standard accounts of the war on the eastern front. There may be some errors in places, but over all this story rings true to me, having read many other accounts of Barbarossa and actions subsequent to the initial invasion. It is pretty well known that OKH was getting pretty nervous about the lack of Russian defenses the further they advanced into the Russian heartland. Got them to thinking that maybe something wasn't quite right with how easy their progress was going. They sure found out why when they got to the Dnepr.The Russians put up an enormous defensive effort once all the detailed German offensive plans were laid bare. That did not occur until some weeks into the invasion. None of the Ultra intercepts could provide those details to the Russians. And that is when their defenses started to buck up. Buy the book and read it, and then read some more accounts and see what you think. This book is certainly worth every penny you spend on it.

There is little attention given, as another reviewer has pointed out, to the negative aspects for the Germans of the Battle of Smolensk and little mention at all of that of Yelnia. The authors reiterate the sabotage of Hitler's strategy and the overall conduct of war by individual military figures, each with his own agenda. After reading this work, it comes as no surprise that Guderian was dismissed from command at the end of 1941, and David Irving's illuminating comments in Hitler's War, one work that modifies significantly the convenient view of conventional wisdom that Germany's military failures were all the fault of the Fuhrer, also make the same point. I seriously wonder if Germany had the economic means to wage a deep war in the Soviet Union, where significant advance leads to significant overexposure, but the authors do point out some possible better outcomes for the Third Reich, if campaigning had chosen different objectives, particularly NOT Moscow in 1941. I count this as a worthwhile addition to the growing literature about the prime theater of the European War which allows us to view it in much more realistic terms than before.

I found this interpretation convincing.

This work is almost a new edition of author Fugate's earlier book, "Operation Barbarossa, Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941" (Presidio Press: 1984). I discovered this while reading when struck with the development of the theme that Zhukov and Stalin were familiar with the plan for Barbarossa and decided to echelon their forces deeply and in strength behind the Dnepr and Dvina rivers to defend Moscow. A quick check with Fugate's earlier work on my shelf confirmed my suspicions. For the doubters, see Chapter One, pages 13 through 59 of the author's earlier work for the development of the Soviet strategy propounded in this work. Thereafter I read to see what was new and interesting, and although there were a few points where the analysis was improved, on the whole I was disappointed. Even the maps and photos were the same or similar. Author Fugate explains more fully the two war games held by the Soviet high command in January of 1941, apparently because documents had been made available by the Soviets/Russians since writing his first book. However, now Fugate alleges that a third war game took place in February, one without documentation except the memoirs of the men lionized by the author, Zhukov and Timoshenko. That this game took place is still speculative and the author's thesis needs confirmation of the game to be taken at face value. It should also be mentioned that Soviet plans and preparations prior to the German attack take up a full third of the book. The battles in the Yelnia salient where exhausted German infantry confronted Soviet counter-attacks and were abandoned by Guderian while he headed southwards to encircle the Soviet forces in the Ukraine are apparently held by the author to be almost a turning point -- in essence they showed that the Germans could be defeated and illustrated how to do it in future campaigns. Frankly, this seems to be overblown. Yes, infantry without armor support can be defeated by a determined enemy, and when one advances too far too fast, it is possible to become overextended and suffer bloody checks. As far as being a blueprint for defeating the Germans, the Yelnia battle doesn't make the grade. The author seems to place a great deal of blame on Guderian for taking ALL his armor south to encircle the Soviet forces in the Ukraine -- but what commander wouldn't use all the forces at his disposal (if allowed by higher headquarters) to defeat the enemy? The major mistake Hitler made according to the author was to turn again towards Moscow immediately following his stupendous victory in the Ukraine. The author argues that once Hitler turned South to seize much of the Soviet Union's productive areas he should have changed his strategy and attacked further towards the Volga and the Caucasus, acquiring the Donbas industrial area and the oil fields in the Caucasus. This was there for Hitler's taking in the last quarter of 1941 according to the author, and might have been sufficient for the Germans to win the war. However, once the Germans ran into Stalin's prescient strategy of defending Moscow and was bled white while attempting to take it, the Soviet winter counter-offensive could defeat the Germans and end Hitler's chance to win the war. If this sounds like a stretch to the reader, well, it does to me too. But it's at least a new take on the subject. The author admits the Germans won more devastating victories in the late drive on Moscow (Operation Typhoon), capturing another 658,000 prisoners in the cauldron battles of Briansk and Viazma, but asserts the Germans should have stopped there. He apparently gives little thought to what that would have done to German morale, both in the army and on the home front. Being pushed back is one thing, stopping while victorious and giving the enemy time to regroup and replenish is another. Nonetheless, the idea that once Guderian turned South that the general German strategy should have been changed from capturing Moscow to acquiring the economic assets in the South is at least interesting. That was the strategy adopted by Hitler too late in his summer, 1942 offensive. Of course, continuing on to Moscow instead of turning South as in the original plan would be an equally interesting thesis. Here the author seems to believe that Soviet reserves defending Moscow would still have turned the tide, particularly given Zhukov's military genius and Stalin's and Zhukov's (& Timoshenko's -- apparently the only thing Timoshenko ever did that was right) clever plans to defeat the Germans at Moscow. Of course, then come in the other arguments: that the Germans had counted on a quick campaign ending before the onset of winter; that Guderian and other generals were simply following the German concepts of "mission orientation" and using the flexibility still afforded commanders in the field at that time; and that the amount of armor allotted to Operation Barbarossa (3,582 tanks and self-propelled guns) was clearly insufficient and that the German was mainly still horse-drawn instead of being mechanized. The author asserts that Zhukov essentially made no mistakes while the Soviet armies disappeared in front of him, and that the losses west of the Dnepr were necessary sacrifices to slow down the Germans. Supposedly they were simply part of the plan since there hadn't been time in the five months since the supposed third war game to move the necessary troops into their proper positions. Again, if this sounds like a stretch, then the reader is comprehending the basic issues surrounding the author's contentions. In short, I found the book mildly interesting while adding a few new rows to the ground already plowed by the author. The work is clearly not intended for newcomers to World War II, and one needs to already possess a comprehensive understanding of Operation Barbarossa and the issues contained in this work. The writing is sometimes repetitive and soporific, and the end notes are minimal and contain few primary sources. In many respects this work does not meet a minimal scholarly standard. The idea that Stalin and his high commanded expected the German attack in 1941 and constructed the best plans and utilized their manpower to the best possible effect from February, 1941 to June 22nd is simply too much for many historians (including me) to accept without substantially more documentation and analysis. Much more evidence points to Stalin dithering in his defensive preparations while expecting an attack more probably in 1942. Certainly Stalin's continual denouncing of intelligence indicating the attack as provocations would seem to indicate that author Fugate still has a long way to go to prove his case.

GOOD