The German Failure in Belgium, August 1914: How Faulty Reconnaissance Exposed the Weakness of the Schlieffen Plan Paperback – May 21, 2019

This slightly less than 200-pages book offers an excellent critique and assessment of the German march across northern Belgium in August of 1914. Chapter 1 “Concept” first describes the original “Schlieffen Plan” for the German First and Second Armies to pass through the Dutch “Maastricht Appendix” to the north of Liege so that they could then advance as the right wing into France and crush the French armies around Paris. Moltke then modified this plan to eliminate the advance into Holland to keep Holland neutral. Chapters 2 through 9 then discuss the implications of this revision both in terms of planning and then also provides detailed descriptions of the movements and fighting of the German and Belgian armies and the consequences.The book also discusses the weaknesses of the German high command in executing the revised plan. Cavalry reconnaissance, communications, and command and control were poor. The ensuing failure to eliminate the Belgian army reduced the strength of the German right wing deployed against the French 5th Army. The German high command (OHL) had remarkably few alternatives or contingencies if the plan failed to perform as expected.The final chapter “Conclusion” then summarizes all the things that the Germans did wrong and also what could have been done better. It was not destined to fail. Per page 184 “After all this, the Germans almost pulled it off.”The text is accompanied by several reasonably good maps showing the movements of the German armies. I found some of the labels to be difficult to read because the printing is so small. Another frustration was that some rivers are not called out.The book only briefly discusses the Belgian “Brialmont” forts around Liege and Namur. A very good booklet on this subject is the Osprey Series “Fortress 60” booklet (60 pages) “The Forts of the Meuse in World War I” by Donnell (2007).The book also only briefly discusses the German 21 cm, 30.5 cm, and 42 cm heavy siege artillery used against Liege and Namur. A very good booklet on this subject is the Osprey Series “New Vanguard 205” booklet (40+ pages) “42 CM ‘Big Bertha’ and German Siege Artillery of World War I” by Rupp (2013).

This little book, written by a trio of excellent World War I historians, provides an in-depth, at times highly technical, revisionist examination of the German invasion of Belgium in August 1914. While most histories of that campaign tend to jump from the siege of Liege directly to the Battle of the Frontiers and Mons and Charleroi, "The German Failure in Belgium" instead looks deep into the pre-existing shortcomings of German cavalry and air reconnaissance capabilities. It then plays out how those shortcomings contributed to the failure of the German commands to pinpoint the location of the French left wing and the British Expeditionary Force. That in turn undermined the entire foundations of the Schlieffen Plan and inexorably led to the reverses at the Battle of the Marne. Anyone interested in the history of World War I and the 1914 campaign in the West must read this book. Five stars don't even come close to the rating it deserves.

Truth in Advertising – I know two of the authors. Despite that I really enjoyed the book and learned a great deal. Like most born in the 1950s I know a lot about WWII and very little about WWI. I had read about the failure of the German right wing to turn the Franco-British flank, but only the accepted wisdom – Moltke took weight away from his right to strengthen his center. At the time the Germans were perceived as having the best Army – which was probably true. However, I learned that the vaunted German General Staff made faulty assumptions, wishing away problems they couldn’t resolve. Having been a deployed medical commander, I sympathized with German cavalrymen. Logistically they were the red-headed stepchildren of the Army. There is much more in this short volume – confusing command arrangements, inadequate communications, more faulty assumptions, and fatal indecision. For anyone with an interest in World War One this book will enlighten you. Very strongly recommended.

If the opening campaigns of the First World War are an interest of yours, here is a slim volume that will warm the cockles of your heart. The Schlieffen Plan (if it really existed and, yes, there are doubts) was Imperial Germany's blueprint for winning a two-front war in Europe by 1) concentrating 7/8ths of its army in the west and 2) concentrating most of that force for a march through neutral Belgium in order to outflank, envelop and destroy the French and British forces in northern France before the Russian's numerical superiority could make itself felt in the east. We all know that the plan failed, but the reasons for this are not, as conventional wisdom supposes, the dispatching of 2 corps to East Prussia or the by-passing of Paris by Von Kluck's 1st Army but rather, according to the authors, the poor planning and lack of resources for the all-important reconnaissance missions to find the vital flank of the Entente forces. Another problem faced by the Germans was how to clear and pass through the "Liege gap" between the Maastricht appendage and the Ardennes, which was greatly complicated by GGS chief Von Moltke's decision to respect Dutch neutrality, forcing the Germans to pass their right-flank armies through the gap in tandem, thereby slowing the assault on the Belgian forts around Liege. These factors prevented the Germans from 1) keeping the Belgian army from retreating to the fortress of Antwerp and 2) locating the BEF in good time to enable its destruction by envelopment. It seems almost unbelievable but the German General Staff, an organization of almost legendary quality and precision, did not make arrangements to ensure these problems could be dealt with in the field. There were also grave problems with the two types of units needed for reconnaissance: cavalry (a type of military force that had reached obsolescence) and aircraft (a very new technology with serious limitations). There were also huge gaps in the ability of both these types of units to communicate what they had seen to higher headquarters, wireless still being in its infancy. Add to all this the usual frictions and fogs of war, and one can see why Moltke's version of Schlieffen's ideas weren't successful. The authors deal with all of these issues in a surprisingly fluid narrative and the copious maps are helpful. An important addition to our knowledge of the early battles of the Great War.

Detailed and meticulous description of the German planning and operational invasion of Belgium and France in August 1914. What was planned, what should have and what did happen. Debunks a number of myths about the German, Belgian and French Armies as well as detailed descriptions of how headquarters and formations used their resources and reacted to unexpected circumstances. A must read for anyone interested in this early period of the Great War.